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FACILITATING FAIRNESS: THE JUDGE'S
ROLE IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION
Walter Mickens was convicted in a Virginia court of the premeditated
murder of Timothy Hall associated with the commission of attempted
forcible sodomy.' A jury sentenced him to death.2 After his conviction,
Mickens filed a federal habeas petition alleging that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his defense counsel, who was court-
appointed, had a conflict of interest at trial. This defense attorney, Bryan
Saunders, had recently represented Timothy Hall, the victim of the crime
for which Mickens was being tried, on assault and concealed-weapons
charges in juvenile court.4 Furthermore, the same juvenile court judge who
dismissed the charges against Hall after his death appointed Saunders to
represent Mickens at his murder trial 5 Saunders did not disclose his
connection to the victim to the trial court, his co-counsel, or his client,
Mickens.6
The Supreme Court granted a stay of execution and granted certiorari
as to the question of whether the judge's failure to inquire into a potential
conflict of interest mandated an automatic reversal of Mickens' conviction.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that, to demonstrate a Sixth
Amendment violation, a defendant must establish that a conflict of interest
adversely affected his counsel's performance, even when the trial court




' Id. at 164-65.
6 Id. at 165.
7 Id. at 165-66.
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failed to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or
reasonably should have known.
8
This Note will argue that Mickens is not consistent with the logic and
principle of the precedents regarding conflicts of interest and the right to
effective assistance of counsel. First, it will critique the Court's formalistic
interpretation of those precedents, focusing on its emphasis on the
requirement of objection. 9 Second, it will analyze the Court's prior Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the holding's inconsistency with the
rationale and spirit of the Sixth Amendment.'o Finally, it will argue that the
rule established in Mickens will have negative implications for the justice
system and the behavior of its participants.
II. BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."'" The Supreme Court has
explained that this right is one of the most important prerequisites for the
existence of a fair trial: "[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the
right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects
his ability to assert any other rights he may have."' 2 Accordingly, the Court
has stated that this right exists "not for its own sake, but because of the
effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial."' 3 This
protection does not only apply to federal criminal proceedings, but also to
all state criminal proceedings. 4 Moreover, it applies both to defendants
who retain their own lawyers and defendants for whom the State appoints
counsel. 5 It is in this context that the Court has found that assistance of
counsel which is ineffective in preserving fairness does not meet the
mandate of the Sixth Amendment.
6
8 Id. at 168.
9 Id. at 168-70.
10 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984).
11 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
12 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654 (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
'" Id. at 658.
14 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) ("The vital guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment would stand for little if the often uninformed decision to retain a particular
lawyer could reduce or forfeit the defendant's entitlement to constitutional protection.").
16 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).
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The main modern case that governs claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel is Strickland v. Washington.1 7 In Strickland, the Court held that,
generally, a defendant who alleges a Sixth Amendment violation must show
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."' 18 Respondent in
Strickland argued ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing, based
on his defense counsel's failure to request psychiatric reports, to find and
present character witnesses, and to seek a pre-sentence report. 9 The
Supreme Court denied his petition, holding that "[t]he benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result., 2 This requires that
the convicted defendant demonstrate first that counsel's performance was
deficient. To demonstrate this, the defendant must show that counsel made
errors so severe that he "was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 21  The standard for judging
performance is an objective standard of reasonableness, but the court's
scrutiny must be deferential to the counsel's conduct.22  Second, the
deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense.23 "This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a trial whose result is reliable. 24  There must be a reasonable
probability that, aside from counsel's errors, "the result of the proceeding
would have been different. 25 Under these guidelines, the Court found that
respondent's counsel's conduct could not be found to be unreasonable, and
that insufficient prejudice existed to warrant a reversal of respondent's
conviction.
The rule elucidated in Strickland is not without exception. In claiming
a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the defendant in a criminal case does
not need to demonstrate a probable effect upon the outcome of the trial
where assistance of counsel has been denied in its entirety or in part during
a critical stage of the proceeding.26 When this occurs, the probability that
17 Id.
1" Id. at 694.
19 Id. at 675.
2 Id. at 686.
21 Id. at 687.
22 Id. at 689.
23 Id. at 687.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 694.
26 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984); Geders v. United States,
425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
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the verdict is unreliable is so high that the effect is presumed, and a case-
by-case inquiry is unnecessary.27 Only in such circumstances, or in
"circumstances of that magnitude," does the Court forgo inquiry concerning
whether counsel's performance actually reduced the reliability of the
verdict.28
Although the Court has established this exception to the usual test of
Strickland, it has not been categorical in its evaluation of what
circumstances constitute a denial of assistance of counsel in entirety or in
part during significant stages of the proceeding. It has, however, examined
whether a circumstance of such magnitude can occur when defense counsel
actively represents conflicting interests.
29
In Holloway v. Arkansas, the trial judge appointed one public defender
to represent three criminal defendants who were being tried jointly.3" Two
times before trial, defense counsel moved for separate representation.31 The
second time, defense counsel objected on the ground that "one or two of the
defendants" were considering testifying at trial, in which event the lone
attorney's ability to cross-examine would be inhibited.32 The court held
hearings on these motions and denied them.33 After the prosecution rested,
defense counsel objected to the joint representation a final time, and again
the court refused to appoint separate lawyers.34  The defendants gave
inconsistent testimony and were convicted.35 The Court acknowledged that
a defense counsel "is in the best position to determine when a conflict"
exists and that he has an ethical obligation to alert the court to any
36problems. As a result, it determined that a defense counsel must be
largely relied upon to make a timely objection regarding any conflicts that
could possibly affect the outcome of the trial.37 Moreover, the conflict of
interest, "which [the defendant] and his counsel tried to avoid by timely
objections to the joint representation," undermined the adversarial process
27 See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59; Geders, 425 U.S. at 91; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
28 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.26.
29 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (noting that a lawyer encumbered
by a conflict "breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties"); see
also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
30 Holloway, 435 U.S. at 477.
"' Id. at 477-78.
32 Id at 478.
31 Id. at 477-78.
34 ld. at 478-80.
" Id. at 481.
36 Id. at 485-86.
37 id.
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of the judicial system. 38  This rationale is supported by the fact that
counsel's conflicting obligations to multiple defendants affect his selection
and presentation of essential information in representing his clients, thereby
making it difficult to measure the exact harm arising from his errors.39
Thus, the Court's ruling in Holloway creates an automatic reversal rule
where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his timely
objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict after
40making a sufficient inquiry.
In Cuyler v. Sullivan,41 the Court again faced the problem of
concurrent multiple representation of codefendants. The respondent,
Sullivan, was one of three defendants accused of murder.42 Each defendant
was tried separately, but they were all represented by the same counsel.43
No one, including their counsel, objected to this multiple representation,
and counsel's opening statement at Sullivan's trial suggested that the
interests of all three defendants were aligned." The Court did not extend
Holloway's automatic reversal rule to this set of circumstances.45 It held
that, without a timely objection from his counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate that "a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his
representation" in order to demonstrate a violation of the Sixth
Amendment.46 The Court found that, unlike the trial court in Holloway, the
trial court in Sullivan was only aware of a vague, indefinite possibility of
such a conflict that is inherent "in almost every instance of multiple
representation. 4 7 Thus, absent an objection, the court found no "special
48
circumstances" that triggered the trial court's duty to inquire.
Finally, in Wood v. Georgia,49 the Court addressed the issue of
conflicts of interest through an analysis of multiple representation as a
peripheral issue. The case involved three indigent defendants "who were
convicted of distributing obscene materials." 50 They had their probation
" Id. at 490.
'9 Id. at 489-90.
40 Id. at 488 ("[Wlhenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over
timely objection reversal is automatic.").
4' 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
42 Id. at 337.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 347-48.
41 Id. at 347.
46 Id. at 348-49.
41 Id. at 348.
41 Id. at 346-48.
4' 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
"o Id. at 262.
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revoked because they could not make the mandatory $500 monthly
payments on their $5000 fines.5 1 The Court initially granted certiorari to
consider whether this violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2 However,
during its consideration, it came to the Court's attention that the defendants
had been represented by their employer's lawyer, and that their employer
had paid the attorney's fees.5 3 This employer had made a general promise
to his employees that he would pay their fines, but in this situation, did not
do so.5 4 The record suggested that the employer's interest in establishing a
beneficial equal protection precedent (thus reducing any future fines he
would have to pay for his indigent employees) diverged from the
defendants' interest in receiving leniency, paying lesser fines, or avoiding
imprisonment.55  The possibility that defense counsel was actively
representing the conflicting interests of employer and defendants "was
sufficiently apparent at the time of the revocation hearing to impose upon
the court a duty to inquire further." 56 Because, based on the record, the
Court was not sure "whether counsel was influenced in his basic strategic
decisions by the interests of the employer who hired him," it remanded to
the trial court in order "to determine whether the conflict of interest that this
record strongly suggests actually existed."57
Because of the differing treatment of the judge's duty in Holloway and
Sullivan, and the ambiguous use of the phrase "actual conflict of interest" in
Wood, these precedents have not combined to produce a clear rule for the
application of the exception to conflict of interest cases. Mickens presented
an opportunity for the Court to interpret Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood
together and extract guiding principles from them to frame the analysis.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Seventeen-year-old Timothy Hall was found stabbed to death, his body
bearing 143 stab wounds, twenty-five of which were fatal. 58 He was found
"lying face down on a mattress under a sheet of plywood., 59 The condition
60
of the scene and his body suggested evidence of recent sexual activity.
' Id. at 262-63.
52 Id. at 264.
53 Id. at 266.
14 Id. at 266-67.
15 Id. at 267.
56 Id. at 272.
"' Id. at 272-73.
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"Five days after Hall's body was found, police officers responding to
the report of an assault upon a juvenile saw Mickens" fleeing the parking
lot of the building where the crime took place and arrested him.6' The
police questioned Mickens about Hall's murder and he revealed knowledge
that the murder weapon was a knife.62 Eventually, Mickens admitted his
guilt to an officer who served him with a warrant for the murder and
forcible sodomy of Hall.63
On August 10, 1992, a Virginia grand jury indicted Mickens for the
capital murder of Timothy Hall involving attempted forcible sodomy.64
The allegation of attempted forcible sodomy made the crime a capital
offense. 65
At Mickens' trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Mickens'
admissions, testimony that Mickens had "sold a pair of shoes which Hall
was wearing at the time of his death," testimony that Mickens was seen
near the scene of the crime, and expert testimony that hair samples and
sperm found on Hall's body were consistent with samples from Mickens.66
Mickens was represented by two court-appointed attorneys, Bryan
Saunders, who was lead counsel, and Warren Keeling.67
At trial, Mickens took the stand and denied his guilt.68  Defense
counsel's only evidence to corroborate Mickens' denial of involvement was
the "testimony of his mother that he was home before dark every night
during the period when the killing must have occurred., 69 Defense counsel
Saunders presented no alternative argument that, regardless of the identity
of the killer, the killing could have occurred in relation to a consensual
homosexual liaison, and therefore did not constitute a capital offense.7 °
The jury convicted Mickens of capital murder in connection with
attempted forcible sodomy.7 1 Very little mitigation evidence was presented
at the jury sentencing hearing, and none of it related to the circumstances of
the offense or to the character of the victim. 72 Mickens received a death
61 Id. at 3.
62 id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 2.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 3-4.
67 Id.
68 id.
69 Id. at 4-5.





sentence.73 That sentence was set aside after the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and remanded to the Virginia Supreme Court to consider a claim
"that the sentencing jury should have been informed about Mickens'
ineligibility for parole from a life sentence. 74
Mickens was again represented by Saunders and Keeling at the new
sentencing hearing.75  Again, Saunders presented little evidence in
mitigation and none relating to the nature of the crime or to Hall's
character.76 The jury again returned a death sentence.77
The trial judge ordered a post-sentence report for the sentence review,
as prescribed by Virginia law.78 After receiving the report, which included
a victim impact statement that quoted Hall's mother as saying that his death
had "shattered her world," that "all I lived for was that boy," and that she
would "never be over the way [her] son was killed," the judge refused to set
aside the jury's sentencing verdict.79 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction and denied Mickens' petition for post-conviction relief.80
Mickens was appointed new counsel for his federal habeas corpus
proceedings. 81 During an investigation of Mickens' background, the new
counsel went to the Newport News Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
("JDRC") to examine his files. 82 Counsel also asked the clerk for Timothy
Hall's file.83 Hall's file revealed that before he had died Bryan Saunders
had been representing him on charges of assault and possession of a
concealed weapon that were going to trial the following week. 84 Counsel
later "obtained a subpoena for the file by reporting what it illustrated about
Saunders' association with Hall. 85
Mickens' federal habeas petition alleged that Saunders' representation
of Mickens had been subject to a conflict of interests, and thereby violated
Mickens' Sixth Amendment rights.86 Information concerning Hall's arrest
for assault and battery of his mother and for possession of a concealed
73 id.
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weapon, and Saunders' representation of him on these two charges in front
of the JDRC, was included in the petition.87 This representation involved
an interview conference. 88
The petition stated that on "April 3, Judge Foster of the JDRC
dismissed the charges against Hall" after his death, and on "April 6, Judge
Foster appointed Saunders" to defend Mickens for the murder of Hall.89
"Judge Foster did not inquire into" a possible conflict of interest, and
Saunders did not disclose his connection to the victim.90
Counsel pointed to Saunders' consistent disregard of defensive or
mitigating strategies that would have cast Saunders' former client in a bad
light.91 For example, Saunders did not develop any line of defense based on
a consensual sexual encounter or investigate into whether Hall may have
been a prostitute. 92 The facts that the "17-year-old Hall was not living at
home, had a Department of Social Services caseworker who was his legal
custodian, had been in foster care," and had criminally assaulted his mother,
were not used in Mickens' defense in any way, even to impeach the
testimony of Hall's mother at sentencing.
93
Saunders was called as a witness at the District Court hearing and
testified that "he never perceived any potential conflict of interests between
his roles as counsel for Mickens and as counsel for Hall. 94 Though the
court found his perceptions to be incorrect, it was still "persuaded that
whatever confidential information Saunders may have learned from Hall"
had no bearing on Mickens' case whatsoever, and it concluded that
Saunders' representations of Hall and Mickens did not constitute an actual
conflict of interest, and that they did not have an adverse effect on his
representation of Mickens.95
A majority of a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed this
decision because it found that Mickens demonstrated "that (1) the state
judge failed to inquire into an apparent conflict that she knew or reasonably
should have known existed, (2) he did not waive any conflict, and (3) his
87 Id. at 7-8.
88 Id. at 8.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 8-9.
9' Id. at 9.
92 Id. at 10.
93 Id. at 11, 13.
94 Id. at 13.
9' Id. at 15.
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lawyer, Saunders, had an actual conflict of interest." 96 The court found that,
under Wood, these facts were sufficient to establish his claim.
97
The dissenter argued that, while "the decision in Wood . . . has not
turned out to be a model of clarity," Wood is best read as requiring a
showing of both an actual conflict of interests and a resulting adverse effect
on counsel's performance, and Mickens had not shown the adverse effect.
98
The Commonwealth's petition for rehearing en banc was granted and
the Fourth Circuit adopted the position of the panel dissent in rejecting
Mickens' Sixth Amendment claim by a vote of seven to three.99 Relying on
Sullivan, the court held that a defendant must show "both an actual conflict
of interest and an adverse effect even if the trial court failed to inquire into a
potential conflict about which it reasonably should have known."'00
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
habeas relief.10'
The Supreme Court granted a stay of execution of the petitioner's
sentence and granted certiorari.1
0 2
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that, in order to
demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court failed to
inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or should
have reasonably known, defendant must establish that this conflict of
interest adversely affected counsel's performance.1
0 3
Petitioners relied on the language in the remand instruction of Wood
"directing the trial court to grant a new revocation hearing if it determines
that 'an actual conflict of interest existed,' without requiring a further
determination that the conflict adversely affected counsel's
96 Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203, 217 (4th Cir. 2000), rev'd en banc, 240 F.3d 348
(4th Cir. 2001), rev'd 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
97 id.
" Id. at 218-24.
99 Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev'd, 535 U.S. 162
(2002).
I ld. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
'02 532 U.S. 970 (2001).
103 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173-74 (2002). Justice Scalia's opinion was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.
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performance."'104  Scalia rejected this interpretation, finding that the
language concerning an actual conflict of interest in Wood refers to a
conflict that actually affected counsel's performance, and not simply a
finding that a possible conflict existed.10 5 He interpreted the statements in
Wood as shorthand for the standard set forth in Sullivan, that "a defendant
who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his
representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief."' 0 6
Moreover, it is highly improbable, that Wood, in which the Court granted
certiorari on a wholly separate issue and where neither of the parties argued
the conflict of interest issue at all, would have changed the previous
constitutional rule established in Sullivan with what Scalia called mere
dictum.'0 7
Furthermore, Scalia stated that an automatic reversal rule that is solely
dependent on the awareness of the court does not make good policy
sense. 1°8 The judge's knowledge of a possible conflict does not make it
more or less likely that counsel's performance was significantly affected or
that the verdict is unreliable as a result. 09 Thus, a "judge's failure to make
the Sullivan-mandated inquiry" does not make it more difficult for
reviewing courts to find actual conflict or effect of that conflict.to
Also, it is not necessary to create such a severe sanction as automatic
reversal to induce judges to be more careful in avoiding possible
conflicts.'' Judges should never be presumed to handle cases in a careless,
arbitrary, or partial manner." 2 Even if there is a deterrent effect, it would
not be significant enough to warrant such a significant rule as automatic
reversal, especially when the Sullivan standard already created an incentive
for judges to inquire into possible conflicts.11 3
Finally, Scalia clarified the breadth of the holding in Mickens." 14 The
only question presented in this case was the "effect of a trial court's failure
to inquire into a potential conflict upon the Sullivan rule that deficient
performance of counsel must be shown."'" 5  The court did not grant
i4 Id. at 170-71 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 273 (1981)).
05 Id. at 171.
106 Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980)).
107 Id. at 172.
108 Id.
'o9 Id. at 172-73.








certiorari to the question of whether or not there was actual prejudice, or
whether Sullivan is even applicable in cases of successive representation, as
it is in cases of multiple concurrent representation.' 16 He further suggested
that lower courts have wildly applied Sullivan to all kinds of conflict cases,
and admonished against this expansive interpretation of Sullivan."7 The
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in Holloway and Sullivan does not
exist to enforce the ethical canons of the legal profession, but to take care of
situations where the Strickland requirement is inadequate in ensuring the
defendant's right to effective counsel.' 18
B. KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Kennedy's concurrence affirmed the analysis of the majority opinion,
but went into more depth concerning why a categorical approach to the
situation in Mickens is not warranted.119 He stressed that the judge's failure
to inquire cannot create an automatic presumption of prejudice as a matter
of law or of policy.' 20 He also stressed the fact that the Court only granted
certiorari to the first question in the case, and not to the question of
whether, in the absence of a presumption, the petitioner had actually
demonstrated that a conflict of interest negatively affected his
representation. Because petitioner probably could not have demonstrated
this actual effect, a finding that there should be a presumption of prejudice
in cases such as this would be faulty.
122
Kennedy examined the factual findings of the District Court, with
regard to whether Saunders was representing conflicting interests during his
representation of Mickens. 23 He stated that the Court must defer to the
District Court's findings that the prior representation did not influence
Saunders' choices made during the course of the trial, unless it can
conclude that the findings are clearly erroneous. 24 Kennedy utilized the
District Court's findings that the alternative strategies suggested by the
petitioner would have been implausible and even detrimental (regardless of
whether defense counsel had any relation to the victim), to illustrate that a
116 id.
... Id. at 174-75.
..8 Id. at 176.
"'9 535 U.S. at 176 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice
O'Connor.
120 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 177 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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categorical approach would presume prejudice where in fact none
existed. 25  Kennedy stated that a strategy asserting a consensual sexual
encounter would have produced a contradiction in the defense theory of the
case, since Mickens alleged he did not commit the crime. 126 Moreover, a
negative characterization of the victim and a strong impeachment of the
victim's mother at sentencing would have backfired. 127 These strategy
considerations were also rejected by Saunders' co-counsel, who had no duty
to the victim, Hall. 128 Thus, a "theoretical conflict does not establish a
constitutional violation, even when the conflict is one about which the trial
judge should have known."' 129
Kennedy also asserted that a categorical rule would expand the duty of
the judge in every instance of ineffective assistance of counsel, not just
conflict of interests, since the Sixth Amendment protects the defendant
from many types of attorney misconduct. 30 Accordingly, "it would be a
major departure to say that the trial judge must step in every time defense
counsel appears to be providing ineffective assistance, and indeed, there is
no precedent to support this proposition."'131 Since the Sixth Amendment
involves the assistance of counsel, a violation of it must involve a
deficiency in counsel, not a deficiency in the trial court.1
32
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens' analysis broke this case into three independent
questions regarding the constitutional right of a person accused of a capital
offense to have the effective assistance of counsel: (1) Does a capital
defendant's attorney have a duty to disclose that he was representing the
defendant's alleged victim at the time of the murder? (2) Does that
defendant have a right to refuse the appointment of the conflicted attorney?
(3) Does the trial judge, who knows or should know of such prior
representation, have a duty to obtain the defendant's consent before
appointing that lawyer to represent him? 33 He asked: if all of these rights
and duties are constitutionally mandated, and if they were all violated in
125 Id. at 178 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126 id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129 Id. at 178-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 179 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
685-86 (1984).
' Mickens, 535 U.S. at 179. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 179-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2003]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Mickens, do their violations constitute "circumstances that are so likely to
prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular
case is unjustified[?]"' 134
As to the first question, Stevens found the attorney's failure to disclose
his prior representation of the victim indefensible, as it violated the trust
inherent in an attorney-client relationship and impaired effective
communication.1 35  He wrote, "Truthful disclosures of embarrassing or
incriminating facts are contingent on the development of the client's
confidence in the undivided loyalty of the lawyer."'' 36 Stevens continued:
An unconflicted attorney could have put forward a defense tending to show that
Mickens killed Hall only after the two engaged in consensual sex, but Saunders
offered no such defense .... This was a crucial omission-a finding of forcible
sodomy was an absolute prerequisite to Mickens' eligibility for the death penalty.
137
Stevens concluded that a client has the right to presume that his attorney has
no other interests that prevent him from completely and exclusively
devoting himself to his client's cause. 138
As to the second question, Stevens found that the attorney's obligation
to protect the reputation and confidences of his deceased client should have
given Mickens the right to insist on different representation., 39 Stevens
stressed that Mickens should have been afforded the opportunity to give
consent to or decline his appointed counsel, and that this right is as firmly
protected by the Constitution as is the right of self-representation. 140
As to the third question, Stevens found that, in the case of appointment
of counsel to indigent defendants, the duty of the judge to make a thorough
inquiry is unqualified, because it is necessary for the judge to have the
protection of the defendant's interests in mind.' 4' At the starting point in
the proceeding, "the defendant has no lawyer to protect his interests and
must rely entirely on the judge."'142
After determining that these three rights were violated and that they do
constitute special circumstances under Cronic, Stevens outlined four
134 Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658
(1984)).
135 Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 180-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1390
(No. 17,733) (CC Me. 1824)).
139 Id. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 183-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975)).
141 Id. at 184-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 184 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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reasons why setting aside the conviction is the appropriate remedy in this
case. 143
First, it is the remedy dictated by the applicable precedents of
Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood.144 The focus in these cases was on the trial
court's duty to inquire into a potential conflict, which was triggered either
by counsel's objection, or by other special circumstances placing the court
on notice of the conflict. 45 This is an unambiguous mandate, and the
Court's ruling in Wood did not undermine it.
146
Second, setting aside the conviction is the only remedy that is fair,
considering that it is possible Mickens may not have received the death
penalty if he had been represented by different counsel who would have
been able to pursue a strategy establishing that the murder took place during
a consensual encounter.147 Moreover, it should be presumed that the lawyer
of the victim of a homicide cannot establish the kind of relationship with
the defendant (charged with the homicide) that is necessary for effective
148
representation.
Third, setting aside the conviction is the only remedy that is consistent
with the historic ethical rejection of the representation of conflicting
interests, especially without full disclosure and consent. 149 Furthermore,
Stevens believes that the majority's assumption that conflicted counsel is
acceptable unless it can be demonstrated that such a conflict actually
affected counsel's performance is contrary to the traditions and principles of
the legal profession.' 50
Fourth, for the judicial system to be just, it must satisfy the appearance
ofjustice.' 5 ' "Setting aside Mickens' conviction is the only remedy that can
maintain public confidence in the fairness of the procedures employed in
capital cases."'' 5 2  Moreover, since a death sentence is a unique form of
punishment that is both ultimately severe and ultimately irreversible, it is
very important that, if it is to occur, its application appears to be based on
reason and not emotion. 153 In essence, any rule, such as the majority's,
143 Id. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 186-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 188 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 188-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Offcut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
(1954)).
152 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358 (1977)).
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which allows a defendant to be forced into being represented by the lawyer
for the victim of the crime, and allows a death sentence to be imposed on
the basis of this representation, is faulty. 
154
D. JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENT
Justice Souter asserted that a judge who knows or should know that
counsel for a criminal defendant in a trial has a potential conflict of interest
is obliged to inquire into the potential conflict and evaluate its significance
to the fairness of the proceeding. 55 Unless the judge finds the risk too
remote or finds that the defendant has reasonably assumed the risk and
waived any potential Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment claim of inadequate
counsel, the court must make sure the lawyer is replaced. 1
56
The District Court Judge reviewing the federal habeas petition found
that the state juvenile-court judge who appointed Bryan Saunders to
represent Mickens in a capital murder trial knew or should have known that
obligations arising from Saunders's recent representation of the victim
potentially conflicted with his defense of Mickens.157 The trial judge was
therefore obliged to examine the significance of the risk and, if necessary,
to either alert Mickens to the potential conflict and receive his consent, or
appoint another lawyer.' 58  Based on these facts, Souter explained the
appropriate remedy for this judge's failure to discharge her constitutional
duty of care in Holloway: "the ensuing judgment of conviction must be
reversed and the defendant afforded a new trial."'
159
Souter characterized the majority opinion as holding that "Mickens
should be denied this remedy because Saunders failed to employ a formal
objection as a means of bringing home to the appointing judge the risk of
conflict."' 6 ° He questioned why an objection should matter when the judge
already knew of the risk and was already obligated to inquire further.
161
Furthermore, he questioned the majority's interpretation of the applicable
precedent, and accordingly re-examined Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood. 16
2
154 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988);
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).
156 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 189 (Souter, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 190 (Souter, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491 (1978)).
160 Id. at 191 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
162 id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Souter's analysis made a distinction between the holdings of Holloway
and Sullivan. In Holloway, the Court reversed the convictions "on the basis
of the judge's failure to respond to the prospective conflict, without any
further showing of harm." 163 In Sullivan, counsel made no objection to the
multiple representation before or during trial, and the defendant did not
argue that the trial judge knew or should have known of the risk described
in Holloway, that counsel's representation might be impaired by conflicting
obligations. 164 The Court held "that multiple representation did not raise
enough risk of impaired representation in a coming trial to trigger a trial
court's duty to enquire further, in the absence of 'special circumstances,'
(the most obvious of which would be an objection). 65 However, the Court
also stated that courts should rely on counsel in "large measure," but not
exclusively. 66 Accordingly, the Court did not reject the respondent's claim
simply because of the lack of objection by defense counsel, but instead
focused generally on the circumstances of the case, which did not indicate
that the trial court knew or should have known that an actual conflict of
interest existed. 67 Thus, it required respondent to demonstrate an actual
effect on the performance of his counsel.
168
The different burdens in Holloway and Sullivan, although seemingly
contradictory, approach the problem of conflicted defense counsel in a
coherent way. 169 Souter wrote: "a prospective risk of conflict subject to
judicial notice is treated differently from a retrospective claim that a
completed proceeding was tainted by conflict, although the trial judge had
not been derelict in any duty to guard against it.' 170 When the issue comes
to the court's attention before it becomes an actual conflict, the court has an
affirmative obligation to evaluate the risk prospectively and eliminate it, or
make it acceptable through intelligent waiver. 71  The error occurred in
Holloway when the judge failed to act, and the remedy, reversing -he
conviction, "restored the defendant to the position he would have occupied
if the judge had taken reasonable steps to fulfill his obligation.' 72 But
163 Id. at 192 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 491).
164 Id. at 192 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 335, 338, 343
(1980)).
165 Id. at 193 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346; Holloway, 435
U.S. at 488).
166 Id. at 193 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167 Id. (Souter, J , dissenting).
168 Id. at 194 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349).
169 Id (Souter, J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
171 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
I17 Id. at 194-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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when the potential conflict comes to judicial attention after the fact, as in
Sullivan, the defendant must show an adverse consequence to get relief,
because in such a case the conflict has occurred through no fault of the
judge. 173
Thus, under the scheme established in Holloway and Sullivan, "there is
nothing legally crucial about an objection by defense counsel to tell a trial
judge that conflicting interests may impair the adequacy of counsel's
representation."'' 74 What was important in Holloway was that the judge was
put on notice that he should inquire. 75 In a normal multiple representation
case, it would take an objection to alert a trial judge to the prospective
conflict, but an objection is not necessary as a matter of law. 17 6
Souter interpreted Wood as a reaffirmation of this scheme, and
perfectly consistent with both Holloway and Sullivan.177 He stated that:
Wood was not like Holloway, in which the judge was put on notice of a risk before
trial, that is, a prospective possibility of conflict. It was, rather, much closer to
Sullivan, since any notice to a court went only to a conflict, if there was one, that had
pervaded a completed trial proceeding extending over two years.178
Therefore, he continued, "since the Wood judge's duty was unlike the
Holloway judge's obligation to take care for the future, it would have made
no sense for the Wood Court to impose a Holloway remedy."'
' 79
Since the District Court in Mickens found that the state judge was on
notice of a prospective potential conflict, the rule established by Holloway
and Sullivan applies, and the remedy for the judge's dereliction should be a
reversal and a new trial.'8s
Souter then proceeded to evaluate whether the new precedent produced
by the majority opinion in Mickens has any merit whatsoever."' He
asserted that the requirement of objection takes the force out of the rationale
of the rules in Holloway and Sullivan, namely that an obligation is created
when a judge is placed on notice of a potential conflict.182 He believes that
there must be a deterrent for failing to act early on.183  Such failures
173 Id. at 195 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349).
174 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
175 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347).
177 Id at 202 (Souter, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 201 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 202 (Souter, J., dissenting).
181 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 202-03 (Souter, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 203 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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increase the probability that errors that are difficult to demonstrate will pass
through the system.184 Thus, Souter criticized the majority opinion for
having the practical consequence of eliminating the "judge's constitutional
duty entirely in no-objection cases. '85
E. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENT
Justice Breyer argued that, in a case where a defendant has had counsel
appointed to him who, at the time of the crime in question, was representing
the victim of that crime, a "categorical approach is warranted and automatic
reversal is required."' 86 "By appointing this lawyer to represent Mickens,
the Commonwealth created a 'structural defect affecting the framework
within which the trial [and sentencing] proceeds, rather than simply an error
in the trial process itself."' 87 Although the parties and other justices spend a
lot of time discussing those precedents which involve the significance of a
trial judge's failure to inquire if that judge knew or should have known of a
potential conflict, Breyer is "convinced that this case is not governed by
those precedents."' 
88
First, without citing any precedential authority, Breyer stated that this
type of "representational incompatibility . . . is egregious on its face."',
89
Mickens simply should not have had a lawyer whose representation of the
victim continued until "one business day before the lawyer was appointed
to represent" him.'
90
Second, the existence of a conflict "is exacerbated by the fact that it
occurred in a capital murder case."' 9' Because evidence regarding the
victim's character may "tip the scale of the jury's choice between life or
death" in a very subtle way, "it will often prove difficult, if not impossible,
to determine whether the prior representation affected defense counsel's
decisions" regarding his presentation of the victim, what kind of
impeachment to use, and what strategy to use at sentencing.' 92 Given the
difficulty in demonstrating actual prejudice because of this subtlety, "the
184 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 206 (Souter, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 209 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined by Justice Ginsburg.
187 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).
188 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 210 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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cost of litigating the existence of actual prejudice in a particular case cannot
be easily justified."'' 93
Third, the conflict was created by the judge in this case. 194 Since the
judge had an active role in producing the situation of incompatible
representation, no duty to inquire would have made the judge more aware
of the conflict than was already obvious.' 9
5
Thus, the appearance of unfairness and unreliability produced by this
breakdown in the criminal justice system, along with the high probability of
actual prejudice occurring, are significant enough to warrant a categorical
rule that the showing of prejudice not be required in such a case to
demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation.196
V. ANALYSIS
Mickens is not consistent with the logic and principle of the precedents
regarding conflicts of interest and the right to effective counsel. The
Court's interpretation of those precedents, with regard to the requirement of
objection to invoke Holloway,'97 is overly formalistic. Additionally, the
jurisprudence expressed in Mickens was not consistent with the function or
spirit of the Sixth Amendment and the precedents regarding the exceptions
to Strickland. '98 Finally, the rule established in Mickens will have negative
implications for the justice system and the behavior of its participants.
The dispute concerning whether prospective notice to the judge or
objection is the vital factor in Holloway is analyzed in Section A, infra.
The majority focuses on the ambiguous language in Wood (as petitioners
did), 199 determining that Wood was probably not intended to create a rule
sub silentio. Justice Souter constructs a "coherent scheme" which
incorporates the logic, if not the language, of Holloway, Sullivan, and
Wood. °° Souter's reading of the precedent finds the overriding principle of
notice behind the ambiguity of the opinions' text, and he discovers a way to
reconcile the decisions without producing a vague or arbitrary standard.z '
Rather than attempting to extract any general principles from the
193 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'9' id. at 210-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 211 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310
(1991).
117 Id. at 168-69.
198 See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984).
9 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 170-73.
200 Id. at 194-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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application of Sullivan in Wood,20 2 the Court establishes a formalistic and
arbitrary objection requirement for invoking Holloway. Although the
majority's emphasis on the significance of the objection in earlier
precedents 20 3 is the result of an accurate reading of the language of those
cases, it fails to recognize that the importance of objection lies in its
function rather than its mere presence.
Section B, infra, examines whether the jurisprudence of the court is
consistent with the rationale and spirit behind the Sixth Amendment. While
204' ntMickens may be consistent with the language of the precedent, it is not in
line with the purpose of the exception to Strickland. The exception exists to
eliminate the requirement of showing prejudice in situations where
prejudice is very likely to occur and where it would be difficult to detect
after the fact. Mickens is precisely the type of case where the dangers are
most likely to occur: a conflict of this nature 20 5 creates a structural
predisposition towards hidden prejudice. Furthermore, the trial judge must
take an active part in meeting her constitutional duty to preserve a fair trial.
The criminal defendant has the right to assistance of counsel only because
of the effect this right has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair
trial.20 6 Thus, as a matter of constitutional principle, the judge should have
a duty to prevent conflicts of interest from occurring, if possible, regardless
of the existence of objection or not.
Section C, infra, examines some of the implications of Mickens for the
participants in the criminal justice system, the judicial system in general,
and future defendants. Mickens will produce perverse incentives for
lawyers and judges, high costs to the judicial system as a whole, and heavy
burdens for defendants with conflicted counsel.
A. OBJECTION V. NOTICE
The Court's ruling in Mickens turned on its interpretation of the
rationale and language of Holloway, Wood, and Sullivan. Its determination
that an objection is required to invoke Holloway's duty to inquire led the
court to frame its analysis through Sullivan. This Note will argue that
notice, not objection, was required to trigger the judge's duty to inquire in
Holloway, and that the Court's interpretation of Holloway and Sullivan was
202 Id. at 172-74.
203 Id. at 168.
204 See id. at 170-73; see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980) (which
interpreted Holloway as requiring an inquiry when "the trial court knows or reasonably
should know that a particular conflict exists").
205 Where a defendant is represented by his victim's recent counsel.
206 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984).
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overly formalistic. While the Court's literal reading of the precedent is
accurate, it fails to fairly examine the functional importance of objection
and accordingly, misses an opportunity to clarify a confusing line of
precedent and solidify an important constitutional principle.
The majority establishes the existence of a timely objection as the
crucial fact that produces a presumption of prejudice in a conflict of interest
case. 20 7 It treats the situation in Holloway as the model of the appropriate
situation to invoke the presumption of prejudice-on the basis of an ignored
objection.20 8 Holloway itself focuses on objection, and declines to offer an
opinion as to what the correct rule would be in cases where there is no
objection.20 9
Non-objection cases were untouched until Sullivan, which made
ambiguous statements about what exactly triggers the judge's duty to
inquire. It begins by extracting a general rule from Holloway: "Unless the
trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists,
the court need not initiate an inquiry." 210 It then states that "[n]othing in the
circumstances of this case indicates that the trial court had a duty to
inquire." 21' In particular, the Court noted that the separate trials reduced the
potential for divergence in the defendants' interests, no participant objected,
the strategy outlined in the opening argument was compatible with all of the
defendants' cases, and the actions of counsel seemed to be generally
reasonable.21 2 This analysis implies that objection is just one of many
circumstances that could trigger the judge's duty to inquire.
The opinion then takes a striking turn, and without explanation, states
that "[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant
who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance., 21 3
The split nature of the decision leaves it open to multiple
interpretations, and Wood reflects its analytical confusion. Wood presents
more questions than answers in interpreting Holloway and Sullivan because
it is not clear about which standard it is following.214
207 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173.
20 Id. at 167-168.
209 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483-85 (1978).
210 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).
211 Id. at 347-48.
212 id.
213 Id. at 348.
214 Compare Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981) ("The possibility of a conflict
of interest was sufficiently apparent at the time of the revocation hearing to impose upon the
court a duty to inquire further."), with id. at 273 (remanding to the trial court "to determine
whether the conflict of interest that this record strongly suggests actually existed").
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The one unambiguous principle that can be drawn from these
precedents is that an objection always qualifies as a "special circumstance"
because it definitely puts the judge on notice, and therefore, triggers his or
her affirmative duty.215 However, neither Holloway nor Sullivan relies on
an objection exclusively. 21 6 The Sullivan Court simply finds that general
knowledge of multiple representation is not enough for the judge to be on
notice of a potential conflict, and therefore, does not trigger the special
circumstances requirement. 217 Given that its analysis was based on "special
circumstances," but its holding establishes objection as the sole method of
notification, it seems very likely that the Court simply did not anticipate a
case like Mickens, where the judge was more informed about a possible
conflict of interest through her own knowledge than she could have been
through objection by defense counsel. If this is not the case, then the
Sullivan Court actively contradicted its own analysis.
Thus, in the face of the ambiguity of Sullivan and Wood, Mickens
presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify the precedent and identify
the important principles therein. The majority resolved the ambiguity in
favor of a creating a concrete, static rule in a case with no objection.1 8 The
Court holds that the judge only has a constitutional duty to inquire into a
conflict where defense counsel makes a timely objection alerting the court
to a potential conflict.219 In Holloway there was an objection; in Sullivan
there was not.220
The most notable distinction between the majority's analysis, as
represented by Justice Scalia's opinion, and Justice Souter's analysis of the
precedent, is their treatment of the concept of notice.221 Souter delved deep
into the analysis in Sullivan and ignored the language of its clear holding.222
He constructed a "coherent scheme" which incorporates Holloway,
Sullivan, and Wood without discord.223 Souter's reading of the precedent
finds a logic behind the ambiguity of the precedent, and he discovers a way
215 See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175, 189, 209, 279-80.
216 Id. at 167-68.
217 See id.
218 Id. at 174-75.
219 Id. at 191.
220 Id. at 170.
221 Compare id. at 175 (in which Scalia argues that the judge's knowledge of a possible
conflict has no bearing on whether the verdict of the trial is reliable or not), with id at 191-
92 (Souter, J., dissenting) (in which Souter interprets the precedent as focusing on notice to
the judge).
222 Id. at 192-93 (Souter, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 191 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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to reconcile the decisions without producing a vague or arbitrary
standard.224
Souter's analysis distinguished Sullivan from Mickens by the fact that
Mickens' judge had actual knowledge. 2 5 He examined the functional
meaning of the objection, by asking: What about an objection could trigger
a judge's duty to inquire? Since the objection makes the judge aware of the
potential for conflict, it triggers the judge's duty. 226 This is in keeping with
Sullivan's affirmation of the principle that automatic reversal should only
be allowed where the judge should have known or actually did know of the
potential for conflict.
227
Contrary to Scalia, Souter found that the notice, and not the objection,
is the necessary special circumstance: in Holloway, the notice came from
constant objections; in Sullivan, there was no notice because there were no
objections, and there were no special circumstances that brought the court's
attention to any particular danger.228 In Mickens, the special circumstances
are threefold: the judge knew that Saunders had represented the victim, she
knew that Saunders did not object to the representation, and she actively
appointed him to represent his client's alleged murderer.22 9 This was not a
passive situation where the judge could not have known of a potential
conflict of interest without an objection.23°
Regardless of this knowledge, the majority argues that it makes little
policy sense to award an automatic reversal in a case such as Mickens
because the judge's awareness or lack of awareness of the potential conflict
of interest has no bearing on the reliability of the verdict unless the conflict
of interest actually had an effect on the performance of the counsel.23'
However, this is precisely the reason prejudice is presumed in some
cases. 23 2 Some kinds of circumstances, including some kinds of conflicts of
interest, undermine the adversarial process of the judicial system by
affecting counsel's performance without leaving footprints.233
224 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
225 See id. at 190 (Souter, J., dissenting).
226 See id. at 191 (Souter, J., dissenting).
227 See id. at 192-93 (Souter, J., dissenting).
228 See id at 192 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the only danger is that of multiple
representation).
229 Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, Mickens (No. 00-9285).
230 id.
231 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173.
232 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984).
233 See id.
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Although the majority's emphasis on the significance of the
objection234 in Sullivan is the result of a fair reading of the language of
those cases, its ruling perpetuated an illusory distinction between notice and
objection. The Court could have bypassed Wood's confusing language 235
altogether and re-examined the significance of notice in its prior
236jurisprudence. Because it did not, objection is now the sole means for
obtaining a presumption of prejudice where a judge knew or should have
known of the possibility of a conflict of interest. However, from a purely
functional point of view, an objection should not be, as a matter of policy
and necessity, a constitutional requirement under the Sixth Amendment as
long as the judge has notice through any "special circumstances."
B. MICKENS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE RATIONALE OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT
This part of the Note will analyze the Court's jurisprudence, focusing
on its inconsistency with the policy rationale and general spirit of the Sixth
Amendment.237 While Mickens may be consistent with the language of the
precedent, it is not in line with the purpose of the exception to Strickland.
The presumption of prejudice only exists to eliminate the defendant's
burden in situations where prejudice is extremely likely to occur and where
it would be difficult to detect after the fact. The Court should have
recognized that Mickens is precisely the type of case that should fall under
the presumption of prejudice because a conflict involving a defense counsel
who represented both the victim and the accused creates a structural
predisposition towards hidden prejudice, especially where the accused is
not apprised of the prior representation. In addition, the Court failed to
recognize the importance of the trial judge in its Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. The actions of the trial judge should have been vital to the
Court's decision because the trial judge in Mickens created the conflict by
appointing conflicted counsel without disclosing it to the defendant.
The presumption of prejudice is triggered when there exist
"circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." 38  These
234 Id. at 173.
235 This is especially true in light of the fact that the majority suggested that the relevant
material in Wood was not definitive because the case was granted certiorari on the Equal
Protection issue only. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175.
236 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,
477 (1978).
237 See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654.
238 Id. at 658.
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circumstances exist where an adverse effect is difficult to observe, precisely
because the adverse effect may not be clear when observing what is
submitted, but entirely clear when observing what is omitted.23 9
Unfortunately, the Court is not privy to what was actively omitted or what
could have been submitted by defense counsel. As stated in Holloway, "the
evil [of conflict-ridden counsel] is in what the advocate finds himself
compelled to refrain from doing, . . . [making it] difficult to judge
intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a
client."2
40
This type of omission error is likely to occur in cases of multiple or
successive representation, because conflict can be expressed in a reluctance
to present certain evidence or pursue a certain strategy. 24' As established in
Sullivan, there is no per se rule allowing the reversal of all multiple
representation cases for which a judge did not inquire into possible
conflicts,2 4 but a conflict where counsel's loyalties are split between two or
more defendants (or between a victim and accused, as in Mickens), may
have a very significant effect on what evidence is presented or how the
defendant (or the victim) is portrayed that is not detectable during or after
the trial. In those cases, setting aside a conviction may be the only way to
return the defendant to where he would have been without the conflict.
243
Hidden prejudice becomes even more important in the context of
sentencing, where the addition or omission of certain mitigating evidence
can make all the difference. Observers after the fact do not and cannot
know how Saunders' prior representation affected his ability to zealously
advocate for Mickens. The conflict may have contributed to his decision
not to impeach the victim's mother's testimony244 or not to argue that the
sexual encounter was consensual. 245  Furthermore, because no one can
know how Saunders' prior representation affected him, it is extremely
difficult to know whether an omission was based on strategy or loyalty to
his former client.246 Thus, the Court failed to analogize the dangers in
239 See id. at 657-58 (explaining the need for categorical approach in the event of "actual
breakdown of the adversarial process").
240 Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490-91.
241 See id. at 490-91.
242 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168.
243 See id. at 187-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244 Saunders might have countered the victim's mother's impact statement with
information about the fact that she accused him of attacking her in the past.
245 A finding of forcible sodomy was critical to the imposition of the death penalty.
Mickens, 535 U.S. at 181 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246 See id. at 178 (Kennedy, J., concurring). When important functions of counsel are
omitted from the defense, prejudice may be presumed. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
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Mickens to the dangers elucidated in its prior jurisprudence concerning the
purpose of the presumption of prejudice. The Court's inquiry should have
been whether a conflict makes the result of the trial unreliable and prejudice
difficult to detect, since these are the factors that drive the exception.
The Court also ignored its prior jurisprudence by minimizing the role
of the judge in facilitating a fair trial. The Court's majority opinion stated
that "the trial court's awareness of a potential conflict neither renders it
more likely that counsel's performance was significantly affected nor in any
way renders the verdict unreliable. 247 Kennedy's concurrence echoed the
sentiment, stating that the "constitutional question must turn on whether
trial counsel had a conflict of interest that hampered the representation, not
on whether the trial judge should have been more assiduous in taking
prophylactic measures."
248
Based on the above comments, it is hard to justify the Court's
willingness to uphold the objection rule of Holloway at all. If awareness is
simply not the issue, then objection is irrelevant. Kennedy seems to suggest
that the objection is important because it signals counsel's recognition of
his own conflict.24 9 If the judge's awareness does not trigger the duty to
inquire, the burden of enforcing the Sixth Amendment is entirely on
defense counsel. What if the defense counsel refuses to recognize his
conflict, or worse, hides it purposely? This type of logic eliminates the
judge as an active player in preventing violations of the Sixth Amendment.
In addition, the majority seems to be arguing against the whole
concept of a presumption of prejudice. In his concurrence, Kennedy states:
It would be a major departure to say that the trial judge must step in every time
defense counsel appears to be providing ineffective assistance, and indeed, there is no
precedent to support this proposition. As the Sixth Amendment guarantees the
defendant the assistance of counsel, the infringement of that right must depend on a
deficiency of the lawyer, not of the trial judge. There is no reason to presume this
guarantee unfulfilled when the purported conflict has had no effect on the
representation.
25 0
Kennedy simply ignores the possibility that the performance of the
trial judge can create deficiencies in counsel.25' In some cases, the actions
of judges bear directly on the effectiveness of counsel. 252 In Holloway, in
318 (1974) (no specific showing of prejudice was required because the petitioner had been
denied the right of effective cross- examination).
247 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173.
248 Id. at 179 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
249 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
250 id.
251 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984).
252 Cf Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
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which the Court found a presumption of prejudice, the judge actively
participated in the deficiency of counsel by refusing to listen to the
counsel's constant objections concerning conflicts.253  Prejudice was
presumed because the judge's actions made it very difficult to determine
whether actual prejudice occurred.254  In the case of indigent defendants
who receive appointed counsel, the judge can affect the quality of the
defendant's representation through his or her choice of appointment. 2 "
In Mickens the judge facilitated the potential for conflict-she did not
simply fail to inquire. This special circumstance underscores the relevance
of the judge to the issue in the case. The judge's role, and the fact that the
case is one of successive representation, makes Mickens significantly
distinct from Holloway and Sullivan. Indeed, Scalia questions whether the
rule in Sullivan should have even been applied to a case of successive
256
representation, and Breyer questions whether the cases cited by the
majority were relevant at all. 257 Breyer states that, "[fin light of the judge's
active role in bringing about the incompatible representation, I am not sure
why the concept of a judge's duty to inquire is thought to be central to this
case. ' 258 Given the possibility that the court in Sullivan simply could not
anticipate a situation like Mickens,259 Breyer's circumvention of Holloway,
Sullivan, and Wood to establish a categorical rule of reversal designed just
for cases like Mickens may have been a valid alternative to attempting to
make sense of the quagmire created by the precedents on multiple
260
representation .
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1844 (1994) ("Many state court
judges, instead of correcting this imbalance, foster it by intentionally appointing
inexperienced and incapable lawyers to defend capital cases.").
253 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978).
254 Id. One reason for the difficulty of discovering actual prejudice is that conflicted
attorneys affect the outcome of the proceeding by selecting what information to present.
Since conflicted attorneys may omit information that could help their clients, a judge's
knowing appointment of a conflicted attorney creates the opaqueness the exception is
designed to circumvent.
255 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984); Bright, supra note 252, at
1844.
256 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168.
257 Id. at 209-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 210 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259 See supra Section Vt, Part B.
260 Given the fact that all the "tests" concerning the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel are judge-made, it would not have been out of the question for the
Court to employ creative measures in deciding a case that is sufficiently distinct from the
closest applicable precedent.
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The criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel
because of the effect this right has on the ability of the accused to receive a
fair trial.2 6' Thus, as a matter of constitutional principle, the judge who is
aware of conflict should have a duty to prevent the unfairness created by
conflicted counsel if possible, regardless of the existence of objection or
not. A judge's participation in the trial process should be evaluated as a
part of effectiveness of representation, especially if the judge actively
participates in the structuring of the attorney-client relationship.
2 62
In addition, the Court has suggested that the Sixth Amendment right is
one protecting against assistance of counsel that "undermines the reliability
of the result of the proceeding" as well as "confidence in the outcome.
263
Thus, the right to effective assistance of counsel has as much to do with
public confidence in the professionalism and integrity of lawyers as with
the results of legal proceedings. 264 Certainly, this rationale would apply to
judges as well, if not more so than to lawyers.265 Because the judge has a
role in maintaining the appearance and actuality of justice, she should be
constitutionally required to prevent the possibility of hidden prejudice.266
This duty should be accentuated in cases where the judge is the creator of
the conflict, as in Mickens.
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF MICKENS FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
This Note argues that Mickens will have negative implications for the
criminal justice system and the behavior of its participants. First, it creates
perverse incentives for both judges and attorneys, contrary to the spirit of
professional responsibility. Second, it creates many more costs than
benefits for both the judicial system and the defendant on trial. Third, it
produces a heavy burden on the defendant that is both ironic and unfair.
1. Perverse Incentives
Mickens produces a scheme by which judges are not deterred from
ignoring potential conflicts. Whether the judge has knowledge or not is
now an irrelevant factor in the assessment of an ineffective assistance of




265 Judges are public officials who operate as unbiased, independent interpreters of the
law. Their rulings on procedural and evidentiary matters can be determinative factors in the
outcomes of trials. Thus, the behavior of judges can influence the public's perception of the
whether the judicial system is operating in a fair and efficient manner.
266 Cf Bright, supra note 252, at 1844.
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counsel claim. The key component is now either the objection of defense
counsel or the showing of an actual adverse effect from a conflict, neither of
which relies on the judge's duty at all. After Mickens, the only time a judge
has a duty to inquire is when defense counsel objects. Notice, as a guiding
principle of the analysis, has been discarded, even though the Court still
pays lip service to the "special circumstances" language from Sullivan.
Judges, if they do not want to be overruled, have an incentive to be less
vigilant to "special circumstances" that may come to their attention without
an objection from defense counsel.
The Court's scheme effectively places all of the burden on the attorney
to trigger the duty of the judge.267 There is no reason for a judge who is
aware of a potential conflict not to (at least) make an inquiry into the
circumstances of that potential conflict.268 In the case of Mickens, the judge
had no reason not to inform Mickens of this potential conflict. 269 An
objection would have been superfluous, since it would only have brought
her own knowledge to her attention. 7°
Although the government's amicus brief in Mickens claims that a rule
of automatic reversal would create a strange incentive for counsel not to
object,271 the majority's own rule creates a much stranger incentive for
judges to ignore the obvious.27 2 Since a rule of automatic reversal would
never affect a judge who had no knowledge of a potential conflict, who is
the majority trying to protect? Judges who know about conflicts and
lawyers who hide conflicts from their clients? These are the very judges
that should be scrutinized the most.
267 Cf Recent Cases: First Circuit Rules That a Defendant Whose Lawyer Had a Conflict
That the Judge Should Have Known About Must Show Adverse Effect to Receive a New
Trial, 115 HARV. L. REV. 938 (2002).
268 From a policy standpoint, it would never be beneficial to the judicial system for a
judge to ignore a potential conflict when he is on notice, because it makes it more likely the
quality of representation will be compromised and it exacerbates the potential costs
associated with claims of wrongful convictions. Something as simple as alerting the
recipient of appointed counsel of the potential conflict is of negligible cost and of invaluable
benefit.
269 See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Mickens (No. 00-9285) (arguing that there were no
barriers preventing the judge from informing Mickens of his counsel's prior client).
270 No party in the case has ever argued that Judge Foster was not aware of the fact that
Saunders had recently represented Hall. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 185 n.9 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("There is no dispute before us as to the appointing judge's knowledge.").
271 The government argued that defense counsel might remain silent to afford his client
with a reliable ground for reversal. Brief for United States as Amicus Curie Supporting
Respondent at 27, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (No. 00-9285).
272 Cf Campbell v. Rice, 265 F.3d 878, 887-88 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rogers,
209 F.3d 139, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1495-96 (9th
Cir. 1987).
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2. Costs and Benefits
The costs of this reduction in the judge's duty are very high, while the
benefits are very low. For the judge, the cost of extending a rule of
automatic reversal to conflicts of interest similar to that of Mickens would
be small. All it would require is a simple inquiry into the conflict,
including an opportunity for the defendant to either waive the conflict or to
ask for new counsel. This inquiry would be minimally disturbing to the
judge and would not significantly delay proceedings.273 For the defense
counsel, the costs would be low as well. The only cost to the attorney
would be the effort required to fulfill responsibilities to his client and his
profession generally.
In contrast, the benefits of this rule would be significant. For the
judicial system, the costs would be equal to the effects of the delay in the
proceedings. But the system would more than make up for this cost in
gains in public confidence, less post-trial litigation, and actual justice for
the accused. The appearance of justice would be upheld, presenting an
image of fair proceedings that are transparent for the defendant.
2 74
Moreover, the judge's early inquiry would prevent the administrative and
economic costs of appeals.275 Finally, the system would benefit from the
defendant's having more knowledge about his counsel's loyalties because it
will increase his ability to help in his defense and achieve a reliable and fair
outcome at trial.
3. Defendant's Burden
Finally, Mickens creates the sad irony that a defendant who has less
effective assistance of counsel will have a heavier burden in proving
ineffective assistance of counsel than a defendant who has more effective
assistance of counsel.276 A defense counsel that objects to the conflicted
representation will be exercising better professional judgment than a
counsel that ignores the possibility of the conflict and refuses to tell his
client about it. Given a judge that has notice of the conflict and does not
inquire, the defendant with the more effective conflicted counsel will be
273 See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
274 Cf Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) ("It is of vital importance to the
defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and
appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."); Offut v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.").
275 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 203 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("It should go without saying that the
best time to deal with a known threat to the basic guarantee of fair trial is before the trial has
proceeded to become unfair.").
276 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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more likely to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
because he will only have to show that the conflict existed, while the
defendant with the less effective conflicted counsel will have to show that
the conflict adversely effected his representation.
This counter-intuitive result is exactly the reason why the judge's duty
should not have been narrowed by the Court. The justice system is most
certainly better off with both defense counsel and judge having an
affirmative duty to inquire about conflict than it would be with only one of
the two. Given the very low costs of the inquiry, Mickens appears to have
created a formula that can only produce a net loss to our system of justice.
V1. CONCLUSION
Mickens held that, in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment
violation where the trial court failed to inquire into a potential conflict
about which it knew, or reasonably should have known, defendant must still
establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's
performance. 77 Mickens is not consistent with the rationale surrounding
other major precedents involving conflicts of interest and the Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel because its requirement of objection
is inconsistent with the policy rationale of the presumption of prejudice. 7 8
The Court's reliance on objection creates an arbitrary distinction whereby
judges with equal notice of conflicts will have varying duties depending on
the action of counsel. Also, since the right to effective assistance of counsel
is closely connected to the general right of the accused to receive a fair trial,
the Sixth Amendment imposes a duty on a judge, insofar as she has the
power to make counsel less effective through her own actions or
omissions.279 This role is essential for a fair trial. Finally, the Mickens
holding provides no disincentive for judges to ignore conflicts that could
substantially damage the rights of defendants. 280 This disincentive is among
many costs created by Mickens, including an increased burden on
defendants and the public's lost confidence in the judicial system.
John Capone
277 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174.
278 See supra Section VI, Part A.
279 See supra Section VI, Part B.
280 See supra Section VI, Part C.
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